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Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Transitions
William Maley*
"Post-conflict transition" is something of a misnomer. Conflicts rarely end
neatly, and "transition" is a deceptively simple label for a complex set of
interconnected processes of change in political, social and economic relations
both within and beyond the borders of a given territorial unit. Such change is
often neither smooth nor linear, but ragged, and with achievements in some
areas being offset by reverses in others. Nonetheless, transition matters, not least
because if brought to successful fruition it can make an enormous difference to
generations of ordinary people. For this reason, it is important to identify the
circumstances that militate in favor of success, and to respect the lessons of
recent episodes in which the intellectual, material and human resources of the
wider world have been deployed to assist transition in states which have
experienced the scourge of conflict.
Contrary to popular belief, international organizations and their key

members have long been involved in addressing aspects of political transition.'
The notion of "self determination" which President Woodrow Wilson thrust
into global political discourse 2 demanded not only some approach to defining
the "self," but also some institutional devices by which "determination" of the
"self" could be accomplished. These issues were not at all straightforward, but at
a practical level they resulted in events such as the 1935 Saarland plebiscite, and
a range of votes held under United Nations auspices during the wave of
decolonization that followed the Second World War. However, it is only in the
last two decades that political devices of this sort have been depicted as
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3
instruments through which to give effect to a right to "democratic governance.,
With a distinct international organization-the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, or "International IDEA"-now charged
with facilitating such processes at the technical level, the UN finds itself faced
with a curious dilemma: in political transitions, it is almost unthinkable to put
forward a roadmap for political change that does not involve at least some form
of popular election, no matter how unpropitious the circumstances may appear
to be.
Yet there are strong grounds for arguing that effective post-conflict
transition involves far more, and that unless a range of other measures are taken,
the holding of elections will be a waste of time, effort, and money. The objective
of this essay is to identify some of these deeper requirements of transition that
must be addressed if a right to democratic governance is to be vindicated. It is
divided into six sections. The first identifies some of the challenges of
governance which prolonged and debilitating conflict tends to produce. The
succeeding four sections discuss in turn the circumstances surrounding the
attempts to foster democratic processes in Namibia, Cambodia, Afghanistan,
and Iraq. In conclusion, the final section explores some implications for
multilateral action, of which the most important is that the circumstances
required for democratic governance to take root are exacting, and that direct
international intervention is rarely an effective instrument for bringing this
about. Rather than easing the way for more applications of force,4 we would do
better to reflect on how blunt is the instrument that intervention offers.

I. DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Defining "democracy" has been a central preoccupation of political
theorists for many years. Issues relating to the nature of choice and participation,
to the role of representation in "democratic" systems, and to the institutional
architecture of a democratic order have all generated extensive literatures.' Yet,
from the point of view of officials concerned with practical matters, one of the
simplest definitions is also one of the most useful, namely that democracy is a
political system marked by institutional arrangements that permit citizens to
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change their government without violence.6 This captures the important
relationship between democracy and accountability, and is undoubtedly
meaningful for peoples trapped in totalitarian, authoritarian, or sultanistic
systems where the ruled have no say in choosing their rulers. Of course, a
definition such as this leaves many important questions unresolved. Robert
Dahl, for example, has highlighted two significant dimensions of
democratization, namely "contestation" (between aspirants to political office)
and "participation" (of the population in choosing rulers).' Is one more
important than the other? Should "contestation" be open to all comers, even
those hostile to a democratic order? Is infrequent "participation" any more than
a recipe for (at best) "delegative" democracy, or (at worst) an elected
dictatorship?8 These are valid concerns even in well-entrenched liberal
democratic systems. In states emerging from severe conflict, a more basic set of
concerns may need to addressed, concerns that fundamentally define the
environment in which the attempt to build a democratic system is being made.
In some territories, a fundamental problem is that of state disruption,
breakdown, or collapse. Political transition is more likely to be straightforward
when it involves simply a change in the identity of those who control the
instrumentalities of the state. It is far more demanding when those
instrumentalities no longer function, so that new rulers inherit only the symbols
of state power (even though the public may expect them to discharge all the
responsibilities associated with control of a fully-functioning state). The erosion
of state capacity is itself a complex phenomenon, in which many different
factors can play some part: fiscal crises through excessive dependence on
unstable revenue sources; internal political conflict over ideology, identity, or
resources; counter-systemic mobilization by groups at the mass level; even
meddling by neighboring states.9 Rebuilding a collapsed state is a difficult task,
because in the meantime new groups can take shape with no particular interest
in seeing the state recover. The problem of state disruption tends to be
aggravated by an erosion of interpersonal trust,10 making it exceedingly difficult
to reconstitute a consensually-unified elite with some sense of civic duty. Yet
6
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one clear lesson is that without such an elite, and without a culture based on
some threshold degree of cooperation, democratic political arrangements will be
very difficult to sustain. As Larry Diamond has put it, "The development of a
pattern, and ultimately a culture, of moderation, accommodation, cooperation, and
bargaining among political elites has emerged as a major theme of the dynamic,
process-oriented theories of democratic transition and consolidation."'" A
mistake sometimes made by those who design transitions is to underestimate the
scale of the problem that state disruption creates: in the early phases of
transition when the state has largely collapsed, struggles necessarily center on
symbolic issues, since the state has little or no distributive capacity; yet struggle
over symbols can easily heighten, rather than mitigate, the more corrosive forms
of distrust.
Another concern is that of finding mechanisms to legitimate new political
authorities. The importance of legitimation-that is, grounding political power
in generalized normative support-can hardly be overstated: it has always been a
major concern of political thinkers. Legitimacy, however, can be produced by
means other than democratic sanctification. Max Weber in his writings
highlighted the roles that could be played by tradition and charisma in generating
legitimate authority. In conflict-ridden societies, established mechanisms of
political legitimation may have broken down; indeed, there may be no single
mechanism that is salient for all politically-significant elements of the population.
Where this is the case, it may be necessary to attempt to weave a number of
strategies of legitimation together, the risk being that to some degree they may
also generate conflicting symbolic messages. Legitimation is central to the
process of consolidation of democracy, which Diamond defines as "the process of
achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at
both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most
right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative
they can imagine."' 2 Yet since it is grounded in changing attitudes and beliefs,
consolidation comes only with time. New institutions go through phases of
infancy and adolescence before they reach an institutionalized state of maturity,
and during these phases they are extremely vulnerable to attack from the very
forces which they may have been designed to constrain.
This is one aspect of the wider "spoiler problem" that haunts many postconflict transitions. 3 Tragically, it is cheaper and easier to be a spoiler than a
builder, and as a result, many "peace processes" have had to cope with parties
that are entirely opposed to a settlement other than on their own exclusive
1"
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terms, or are ready to resort to destructive behavior as a device for securing
benefits which they would otherwise be denied. Finding mechanisms to deal
with spoilers can be exceedingly difficult. "Total" spoilers may be impossible to
accommodate, and even "partial" spoilers may voice demands that other, more
constructively-minded parties nonetheless find difficult to accept. A robust,
neutral security force 14 can send a useful signal to "partial" spoilers not to press
their claims too far, but can also offer a tempting target for "total spoilers" to
strike as a way of signaling their own ongoing political significance.
This brings us to a final concern of real significance: the strength of
commitment of the wider world to processes of transition which global actors
may have played some role in initiating. Great powers are fickle: their stayingpower can be sapped by developments in their own internal politics.
Governments in democratic countries can be displaced, sometimes as a result of
failure at the polls, sometimes through the functioning of constitutional
limitations on the number of terms that an executive leader may serve.
Moreover, even when a government retains office, it may not legally be in a
position to honor its past commitments, since the resources it needs to do so
may not be under its exclusive control. For example, the Vietnam War ended in
1975 in part because the US Congress, unable to identify a credible strategy for
success, was no longer prepared to appropriate the sums required to sustain a
US commitment to the government of South Vietnam."5 Transitions are not only
time-consuming, but are also extremely expensive.
There is no doubt that many senior UN officials are alert to these
complexities. 6 That said, the pressures from member states to produce swift
solutions to complex problems have locked UN staff into a rather simple model
of transition, based on the notion of "free and fair elections," either for a
constituent assembly or for specific constitutional offices such as a presidency or
a parliament. The UN Secretary-General in 1991 made a first attempt to
elaborate such a notion," but the most detailed account of what is required has
been offered by the political scientists Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson.
"Freedom," they argue, "entails the right and the opportunity to choose one
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thing over another."' 8 This implies a coercion-free environment for voters. Key
freedoms (for both voters and candidates) include freedom of movement,
assembly, association, and speech, as well as freedom from intimidation, and
universal adult franchise. "Fairness," they argue, means impartiality, and
"involves both regularity (the unbiased application of rules) and reasonableness (the
not-too-unequal distribution of relevant resources among competitors)."' 9
Criteria for fairness include independent electoral authorities, impartial voter
education, fair media access, secure polling stations and ballot boxes, and
appropriate, transparent, and reviewable scrutiny procedures. 0 This has opened
the door for an entire industry of international electoral administration,
assistance,
and observation, much of it carried out by professionals of exemplary
1
2

skiil.

What this model of transition does not do is even contemplate, let alone
address, the political consequences of electoral laws, an issue that political
scientists have long recognized as a central issue in crafting democratic
transitions. 22 At one level this is not surprising. As Reilly and Reynolds have
argued, there is "no perfect election system, and no 'right' way to approach the
subject of electoral system design., 23 Nonetheless, it is by now widely recognized
that some electoral systems seek to give effect to a "majoritarian" vision
intended to produce a strong and effective government, while others seek to
give effect to a "proportional" vision, in which a wide range of societal interests
can be institutionally represented.24 In the aftermath of a major conflict, it is
likely that there will be strong demands for both an effective and an inclusive,
finely-representative government, something that highlights the extreme
difficulty of satisfying the different voices that intense conflict can generate. As a
consequence both of striking a balance between different democratic visions and
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of the wider concerns defining the environment in which democratization is
attempted, solutions to a divided society's problems may be difficult to devise
and to implement. That is certainly a lesson of some recent episodes of
attempted transition.
II. NAMIBIA
A useful starting point in analyzing recent cases of attempted transition is
the process that led to the independence of Namibia in 1990, after years of
struggle between the South African occupiers and pro-independence forces. The
transition of Namibia to independence was accomplished in a remarkably
smooth manner and prompted a high degree of optimism about what
multilateral involvement could add to such processes. In hindsight, however, the
Namibian case was not so much a precedent for future operations as an
indicator of how fortunate a concatenation of circumstances was required to
bring such transitions to a happy conclusion.
The question of Namibia was one that had long been a preoccupation of
the UN. Previously a German colony, it had become subject to a League of
Nations mandate (under the name of "Southwest Africa") in 1920, with South
Africa as the mandatory power. When the mandate system was replaced with the
UN Trusteeship system, South Africa maintained that the situation of its control
of the territory remained unchanged, and continued to hold to this position even
after the International Court of Justice concluded in an Advisory Opinion 21 that
General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 27, 1966, recognized by
the Security Council in Resolution 276 of January 30, 1970, had been effective in
terminating the mandate. This created a stalemate; progress on independence for
what most countries (and the UN) had come to call "Namibia," therefore,
depended upon a political breakthrough, and for a long while this seemed
unlikely. South Africa viewed its control of Namibia as an asset to be traded in
exchange for political change elsewhere in Southern Africa, where the presence
of Cuban troops, and the persistence of Soviet influence, linked the region to
wider Cold War tensions. Change came about in the late 19 80s, not least because
of leadership and ideological change in the USSR, where Mikhail Gorbachev's
doctrine of "New Thinking" emphasized the need to find solutions to regional
conflicts. Security Council Resolution 435 of September 29, 1978, had laid a
foundation for transition in Namibia, and on December 22, 1988, South Africa
became party to an agreement with Angola and Cuba which provided a more
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specific framework.26 This agreement led directly to the deployment from April
1989 to March 1990 of the "United Nations Transition Assistance Group"
("UNTAG") and to Namibian independence on March 21, 1990.
The UN's role in the Namibian transition was substantial, but formally
indirect. A South African administration remained in place, headed by an
Administrator-General, and it was responsible for the physical conduct and
supervision, under UN control, of an election for a Constituent Assembly to
draft a new constitution. With a view to fostering a spirit of compromise, the
parties to the 1988 Accords had agreed that a two-thirds majority would be
required to adopt a new constitution. As expected, when the election was held, a
majority of the vote, 57.3 percent, was cast for the South West African People's
Organization ("SWAPO"), which had been involved in a lengthy guerrilla
campaign against the South African presence. However, its main opponent, the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, and a range of smaller parties, won sufficient
votes to deny SWAPO a two-thirds majority, and prompted an intra-elite
compromise on the constitution. While UNTAG experienced nineteen fatalities
during the deployment, and the whole mission briefly teetered on the edge of
failure in late March 1989 when some SWAPO radicals mounted an armed
incursion from Angola, the mission on the whole was a remarkable success."
What was perhaps overlooked was how easily the mission could have gone
awry if circumstances had been even slightly different. First, Namibia had an
excellent infrastructure and a functioning state administration over which the
new Namibian authorities would be positioned to assume control. Namibia was
not a "failed state" in any meaningful sense of the term. Second, the mission
benefited from long and careful planning. It had been a significant
preoccupation of the UN General Assembly for much of its life, and a range of
competent officials had been involved in discussions over its fate. One of the
most important was Marti Ahtisaari, who served as Special Representative of the
Secretary-General ("SRSG") during UNTAG's deployment. Third, the 1988
Accords were a direct product of a convergence of interests among the key
external and internal actors, which gave them a robustness that not all such
agreements have enjoyed. Indeed, when rogue SWAPO elements mounted the
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March 1989 incursion, they met with fury from some of SWAPO's key backers
in the Organization of African Unity. Fourth, the support for the process from
the Security Council, with clear backing from the United States and the Soviet
Union, meant that the approach to conflict resolution that the UNTAG mission
embodied could claim a high degree of international legitimacy. Fifth, in spite of
the flurry caused by the March 1989 incursion, the process did not come under
serious attack from spoilers (although Ahtisaari had to endure a certain amount
of abuse over his courageous decision to approve the release of the South
African force to deal with the immediate threat of the rogue incursion). Sixth,
Namibia had a small population-less than a million Namibians enrolled to
vote-and the degree of ongoing international interest after independence was
sufficient to sustain some economic progress and a high degree of political
institutionalization. Finally, Namibia's new political leadership displayed notable
maturity and laid the basis for civil politics. Namibians were exceedingly lucky to
find these factors at play. There is no particular reason to believe that all peoples
emerging from an era of prolonged and debilitating conflict will be so fortunate.
III. CAMBODIA
A sense of pride in what had been achieved with the UNTAG model was
one of the factors that contributed to the larger mission in Cambodia in 19921993. However, the Cambodian situation was markedly more complex than that
in Namibia, and the mission of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia ("UNTAC') much more ambitious.
Cambodia's tragic history in the last decades of the twentieth century
accounted for these complexities.28 In 1970, a coup led by General Lon Nol and
Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak overthrew Cambodia's longtime ruler, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk. Corrupt and inefficient, the Lon Nol regime was in turn
overthrown in April 1975 by the radical Khmer Rouge ("Red Khmer") militia.
Driven by a murderous and paranoid ideology, these fanatics embarked on
wholesale social reorganization and mass murder of their perceived enemies.2 9
They also clashed with their larger Vietnamese neighbor, and this proved their
downfall. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthrew the
Khmer Rouge regime, replacing it with a pro-Vietnamese regime headed first by
Heng Samrin and then by Hun Sen. The consequence was to create a multilayered Cambodian problem, both internal and regional. The internal problem
28
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related to the acceptability to Cambodians of what, at least in its early phases,
was a classic puppet government: the new regime encountered ongoing
resistance not just from surviving elements of the Khmer Rouge, but also from
non-communist factions such as the Khmer People's National Liberation Front
("KPNLF"). The larger problem, however, was regional. Notwithstanding the
Khmer Rouge's abominable record of atrocities, the member states of the
Association of South-East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") stood firmly in opposition
to the use of force by one state to overthrow the government of another. They
therefore refused to deal with Heng Samrin, whose regime depended upon
Soviet subventions, as well as backing from Vietnamese troops, which were
finally withdrawn only in 1989.
The withdrawal of Soviet troops opened the door for progress on the
Cambodian issue. China, a long-term backer of the Khmer Rouge, moved to
normalize its relations with the Soviet Union, and this created opportunities to
seek Chinese backing to push the Khmer Rouge into a settlement. The terms of
any settlement were always going to be awkward, since Hun Sen's regime
enjoyed firm control over coercive state instrumentalities, which other parties
feared would be used to their detriment during any transition culminating in an
election. This impasse was finally broken in the Paris Accords of October 23,
1991, based on ideas developed by US Congressman Stephen Solarz and
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. The Accords provided for a
"Supreme National Council," chaired by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to act as a
repository of Cambodia's sovereignty, and for a UN transitional authority that
would actually take control of key state instrumentalities (to ensure a level
playing field), in anticipation of elections for a Constituent Assembly, which the
UN authority would itself organize and conduct.3" At a superficial level, the
project was a considerable success. Despite delays in the deployment of UNTAC
following its establishment by Security Council Resolution 745 of February 28,
1992, the elections were held on time in May 1993, a new constitution was
drafted by the elected Constituent Assembly, and the Assembly itself became the
legislative body under the new system of constitutional monarchy. The process
was hailed as a success by regional states, and Cambodia was rapidly reintegrated
into regional political processes.
However, as an exercise in instituting democratic governance, its results
were far patchier. UNTAC proved unequal to the task of bringing the coercive
instrumentalities of the state under effective international control. While
obstreperous behavior by the Khmer Rouge received a great deal of attention,
the more serious problem in the run-up to the election was the campaign of
30
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intimidation mounted by cadres of Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party
("CPP"). The CPP went into the election confident that it would secure an easy
victory. In fact, when votes were tallied, it secured only 38.2 percent of the vote,
compared with 45.5 percent won by the royalist FUNCINPEC party, and 16.3
percent by a mixture of other parties and candidates. At this point, the CPP
flexed its muscles. It managed to force FUNCINPEC-and, more disturbingly,
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General-to accept a postelection bargain in which the FUNCINPEC leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh,
would become "First Prime Minister" and Hun Sen would (paradoxically) be
named "Second Prime Minister." The consequence was that CPP loyalists
retained control of the state's coercive capacity. For the 61.8 percent of voters
who in the face of considerable danger had done all they could to eject the CPP
from office, the outcome could only have been a bitter disappointment. The
upshot was grimly predictable. Hun Sen made methodical use of "salami tactics"
to slice away at his opponents and finally overthrew Ranariddh in a coup in July
1997. While the suggestion has been advanced that this was "validated" by
Cambodia's election of July 26, 1998,"' the sad reality is that the party that lost
the 1993 election ran the 1998 election, in a fashion which made a mockery of
freedom and fairness.
The UNTAC mission was successful in resolving a "regional problem," but
as an exercise in democratization, it was largely a failure. A new "democracy"
that is compromised from the outset and breaks down in less than five years
clearly is not what effective democratization is about. There were a number of
reasons why the fortunate experience of Namibia was not replicated. First, the
interests of the Cambodian parties had not converged to favor a democratic
settlement. The Khmer Rouge accepted the Paris Accords only under Chinese
pressure, and the CPP did not accept them in good faith. Each of these forces
moved (in its own way) to subvert the process to which it was nominally
committed, and once the results of the 1993 election were declared, the CPP
acted as a serious spoiler. Second, the UN was not organizationally equal to
exercising the control over the Cambodian state that the Accords envisaged; the
components of the mission that worked most smoothly were those that did not
depend on cooperation from officials loyal to the CPP and drew on professional
staff contributed by member states.33 Third, the Secretary-General's Special

31

Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, UnderstandingPeacekeeping 126 (Polity 2004).

32

See John M. Sanderson and Michael Maley, Elections and Liberal Democragy in Cambodia, 52 Ausd J
Intl Aff 241 (1998).

33

For varying perspectives on UNTAC, see MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Cambodia
Confounds the Peacemakers 1979-1998 (Cornell 1998); Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the
Cambodia War From Battlefield to Ballot-Box (Oxford 1997); Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in

Winter 2006

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

Representative, Yasushi Akashi, proved weak at the very points in the process
when strength was most needed-a willingness to compromise is an important
component of democratic culture, but this does not mean that compromise is
always desirable. Fourth, as soon as the "regional" problem of Cambodia was
solved, the wider world began to lose interest, and by 1998, there was little
interest any more in demanding that Cambodian elections meet acceptable
international standards. Democratization, unfortunately, can be betrayed by its
ostensible friends as well as its obvious enemies.
IV. AFGHANISTAN
The case of Afghanistan differs from those of Namibia and Cambodia in a
number of instructive ways. Substantial involvement on the part of the wider
world came only in 2001 in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and was
far more complex, given that the Afghan state had substantially collapsed. In
contrast to the cases of Namibia and Cambodia, "democratization" in
Afghanistan came in the aftermath of a major international intervention, albeit
one well justified by both legal and political considerations.3 4 Afghanistan also
dwelt in a much more threatening environment than either Namibia or
Cambodia, and the Taliban movement, which had imposed a pathogenic form
of religious extremism on ordinary Afghans, was substantially a creation of the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate ("ISI") of the Pakistan armed forces.35 In
addition, the UN's operational role through the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan ("UNAMA"), established by Security Council Resolution
1401 of March 28, 2002, was much less forceful than in Namibia or Cambodia,
with a "light footprint" being its objective.3 6 It is too early to make a final
judgment on the process of political transition that Afghanistan has experienced,
but there are a number of lessons that can already be derived from events since
the collapse of Taliban power.
Few states have endured turmoil of the kind that afflicted Afghanistan in
the last quarter of the twentieth century.37 A Marxist coup in April 1978 brought
to power an immature and fragmented gaggle of revolutionaries who launched
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an attack on key symbols and leadership in Afghan society before turning with
near-equal ferocity on each other. A consequence was the loss of state revenues
as swathes of the country slipped from government control into the hands of
groups in the Afghan resistance (Mujahideen). In December 1979, in the hope
of salvaging pro-Soviet rule, the USSR invaded Afghanistan and installed a
dependent regime. Soviet troops were finally withdrawn under the influence of
the doctrine of "New Thinking" by 1989, but Soviet aid to the regime
continued. Nonetheless, when that aid was cut off at the end of 1991, the regime
collapsed shortly afterwards. The Mujahideen, however, did not inherit a
functioning state, and a struggle for control of the symbols of the state broke
out between moderate elements with support in Afghanistan, and extremist
groups backed by Pakistan, of which the Taliban movement, which first
emerged in 1994 and seized Kabul in September 1996, was the most eccentric.
With the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the UN was immediately drawn
in to promote an elite settlement bringing together the Taliban's key Afghan
opponents, and the result was the Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001.3
Carried out under the guidance of UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, the negotiations
provided for the popular Hamed Karzai to become Chairman of an Interim
Administration; an "Emergency Loya Jirga" (Great Assembly) to be held to turn
this into a more broadly-based "Transitional Administration"; a "Constitutional
Loya Jirga" to craft a new constitution; and elections to choose occupants of the
main elected offices of state. All of these milestones were achieved, with Karzai
being elected President on October 9, 2004 with 55.4 percent of the vote. Yet
Afghanistan is by no means out of the woods, and there are reasons to be
seriously concerned about its prospects.
First, Afghanistan is not in a "post-conflict" transition. Violence continues
to mar the daily lives of ordinary Afghans, and coalition forces as well as Afghan
officials have been targeted for terrorist attack.3 9 The inability of the Karzai
government to provide security could significantly affect its standing. This failing
reflects the sad reality that a collapsed security sector cannot be re-created
overnight, since effective militaries depend on a strong ethos of institutional
loyalty that cannot be constructed by decree. Second, there is a wealth of
potential spoilers in Afghanistan. Some are obvious. These include remnants of
al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the radical Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. Others are outside Afghanistan's boundaries; here one should note
the malign effects of Pakistan's accommodation of prominent Taliban who
operate openly from the city of Quetta. Others are latent, and it is important to
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be alert to the possibility that in certain circumstances, actors who are apparent
supporters of the transition process might turn against it-if, for example, the
voting system for parliamentary elections denied them the representation to
which they believed they were entided. ° Third, Afghanistan has become a major
venue for opium cultivation, 4' and while it would be a considerable exaggeration
to describe Afghanistan as a "narco state," the ubiquity of this illicit industry
undermines efforts to build a civil economy. Fourth, the strategic environment
of Afghanistan remains dangerous, not just as a result of Pakistani meddling, but
also because Iran, if exposed to unpalatable external pressure, might respond by
stirring up trouble in Afghanistan. Fifth, Afghanistan has suffered from the shift
of attention to Iraq as a theater of military operations.
The irony here is that there was initially every reason to be optimistic about
Afghanistan. The use of force to overthrow the Taliban was widely accepted in
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, both in statements of key states and
in the higher organs of the UN. 42 Most ordinary Afghans were happy to
welcome an international intervention as a rescue mission rather than as a threat
to their interests. Two developments, however, caused a serious loss of
momentum. One was the public blocking by the Bush administration of the
expansion of the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul.43 The
other was the slow flow of resources to support the transition.' The message of
these developments for Afghan political actors was stark: the wider world,
despite its rhetoric, was not committed to Afghanistan for the long haul. This is
exactly the kind of signal that undermines efforts to replace zero-sum politics
with a culture of give-and-take, and weakens the prospects for the consolidation
of democratic governance.
V. IRAQ
In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, "democratization" was preceded by a major
intervention that overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet despite the
holding of an election for a Transitional National Assembly on January 30, 2005,
the Iraq case offers a textbook example of how severe the difficulties following
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an intervention can prove to be.4" Only the bravest of observers would
confidently predict that the outcome of the Iraq intervention will be the
establishment of a consolidated democracy. The Iraq case plainly shows that the
overthrow of an autocracy does not automatically lead to democracy. On the
contrary, in the absence of careful planning it can easily lead to chaos and
mayhem.
Regime change in Iraq was the result neither of a carefully-planned process
of negotiated change, nor of a widely accepted act of self-defense against an
aggressor. Operation Iraqi Freedom was mounted as a result of a policy decision
taken by the United States, backed by the United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain.
The policy justification, namely the threat allegedly posed by Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction, proved spurious when it emerged after the invasion that there
were no such weapons to be found.46 Furthermore, attempts at legal justification
provided by the Bush administration after the invasion, harking back to Security
Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, in response to Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, were at odds with much competent legal opinion.47
In Iraq, virtually all the prerequisites for smooth transition were absent.
First, planning for the post-intervention phase of Iraqi life was inadequate. The
outputs of a serious study program undertaken by the US Department of State
were largely ignored by the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense,
which became the lead agency in administration of the occupation. Furthermore,
the Department of Defense's approach was marked by a great deal of baseless
optimism and self-delusion.4 8 Second, the intervention did not put an end to
conflict. The United States, its allies in the intervening coalition, and its Iraqi
partners were all targeted in a campaign of assassinations, suicide bombings, and
brutal kidnappings that ruined the image of a smooth and popular transition that
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the Bush Administration had hoped to project. Third, the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein triggered a breakdown in some key instrumentalities of the state, and
this was greatly aggravated by the subsequent decision of the occupation
authorities to break up the Iraqi Army as a functioning institution.4 9 This not
only created opportunities for spoilers to function in a dramatically effective
way, but arguably, it also added to the number of spoilers with which the
Coalition Provisional Authority and its Iraqi associates were required to cope.
Fourth, the Iraqi population, while for the most part welcoming the removal of
Saddam Hussein, remained deeply divided on ethnic and sectarian lines, creating
major difficulties in procuring any consensually unified elite. The difficulty in
constituting a government after the January 2005 election highlighted this
ongoing problem. Fifth, the United Nations was initially marginalized as a
contributor to the transition, and after the suicide bombing of UN offices in
Baghdad on August 19, 2003, which killed SRSG Sergio Viera de Mello and
many other UN staff, there was little mood in UN agencies to take grave risks in
order to help rescue the United States and its allies from a deteriorating
situation. Sixth, the Bush administration, having ignored the concerns of many
states over the legitimacy, legality, and wisdom of the attack on Iraq, found itself
poorly positioned to seek the assistance of those states to make a floundering
transition process work."° There is a salutary lesson here: while great powers may
persuade themselves that what they are doing is legal, if they cannot persuade
others, they may face unpleasant political consequences. This reality was
captured in a prescient observation made centuries ago by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he
transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty."'"
The Iraqi case illustrates yet again that there is far more to
"democratization" than the holding of an election. That polling took place at all
at the end of January 2005 was a tribute to the courage of many ordinary Iraqis
and the determination of polling staff, both local and international, to give those
Iraqis the chance to have their voices heard. That said, there are some haunting
similarities between the situation in Iraq, and the situation in Vietnam on the eve
of the Tet offensive. Elections in South Vietnam in 1967 had been met with a
great deal of optimism, and officials such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
President Lyndon Johnson were forthright in declaring that failure was not an
option. This did not prevent three decades of one-party rule in Vietnam
beginning in April 1975. The American historian Gertrude Himmelfarb has
written ominously of the "dark and bloody crossroads" where nationalism and
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religion meet.12 This seems an almost perfect description of the environment in
which democratization is being attempted in Iraq.
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION
As these cases show, the United Nations has been directly involved in
transitions in a range of different circumstances, and with varying results. But
just as it is useful to be alert to the complexities of the idea of "post-conflict
transition," so also should it be conceded that the "United Nations" is not a
united organization. Rather, it is a family of institutions and agencies with
different roles and resources. In a conflict situation, the Security Council
typically lays down a broad mandate for UN action; member states (including
those that have been involved in Security Council decision-making) make
decisions about whether and to what extent they will directly support the
activities that the Council has mandated; and the Secretariat will make do with
what resources come its way. This is in many ways a most unsatisfactory
situation, as the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations made clear.5 3 The
inability of the UN to respond to the emerging Rwandan genocide in April 1994
was a product in large measure of the reluctance of major powers to become
involved. However, it also resulted in part from the shortage of personnel and
resources in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda ("UNAMIR")
even from the point of view of its original mandate.5 4 Reform of the UN to
permit the matching of resources to mandates is very important, but also quite
unlikely; a more robust UN is not necessarily what the UN's most strenuous
critics want to see. 5 For example, while President George W. Bush spoke
publicly in early 2004 of the important role of UN envoy Brahimi in facilitating
internal political change in Iraq, in practice US officials interfered with Brahimi's
efforts to put in place an interim administration of politically-neutral
technocrats.
Confronted with the difficulties surrounding "democratization," and the
intrinsic fragility of the UN as a multilateral instrument for promoting it, one
might be tempted to abandon as overly ambitious the hope of using democratic
devices in post-conflict situations. Caution has been preached, and with careful
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supportive reasoning, by a number of scholars.56 Democratic choice mechanisms
are divisive, they are expensive, and they can create grossly unrealistic popular
expectations of what a political system can reasonably be expected to deliver.
The temptation to abandon them in favor of strong rulers who can deliver
security and some other basic goods is considerable. But such an approach can
be just as perilous as a "one-shot" approach to democratization based on the
holding of a single election as an exit strategy. A "strong ruler" certainly need
not enjoy automatic legitimacy, may actually provoke fresh internal conflict, and
provides a tempting target for assassination. To sustain stable government, there
is no substitute for institutions that allow ordinary people to rule well.
It is from this point that one can derive an effective response to the
repudiation of democratization. If democracy is a political system marked by
institutional arrangements that permit the change of government without
violence, then the focus of international organizations should be on institutionbuilding, rather than simply the holding of elections. In consolidated
democracies, electoral processes are nested in a wider frame of norms and
institutions that ensure the outcomes of exercises in popular choice are accepted.
Without such a frame, there is a risk that the results of popular choice will either
be repudiated by the losers (as happened in Angola in September 1992) or result
in carnage (as occurred in East Timor in September 1999). Elections should be
preceded by concerted steps to restore a functioning judiciary and a culture of
legality, and a functioning police and a culture of law-enforcement. A
"democratic" society without justice may be much less appealing to ordinary
people than a just society in which elections have been delayed until it is safe for
them to be held. The rule of law as a political principle has arguably taken root
in Namibia, but only the starry-eyed would suggest that it has much hold in
Cambodia, Afghanistan, or Iraq. The rule of law is central to democratic civility,
and without it there can be little in the way of meaningful democratic choice.
Meaningful choice is free choice, and without a framework that protects citizens'
freedoms, the "choices" citizens make should be seen as a form of theater rather
than as an exercise in popular decision-making. The difficulty, of course, is that
the holding of an election is a discrete "event" which the organizers can paint as
a "success," whereas the establishment of institutions of justice is a slow process
that does not lend itself to instant celebrations.
The lessons of recent experience are sobering. Transitions go smoothly
when a range of exacting conditions are satisfied: when the state remains largely
intact; when there has been an opportunity for careful planning of the transition;
when local actors have sincerely agreed to work together; when key international
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actors support the process; and when the process is legitimated through
international institutions. The absence of even one of these conditions gives rise
to serious difficulties, not least that of maintaining international engagement. In
the face of these constraints, one would need to be a considerable optimist to
conclude that post-conflict transitions are likely to be better handled in the
future than they have been in the past. The Iraq case virtually guarantees that for
a while at least, even the most powerful states will mount interventions only with
considerable caution, and this may reduce the number of states in which the UN
is invited to run some kind of repair operation. However, the problems of postconflict transition fundamentally reflect a mismatch between the scale and
difficulty of the tasks involved, and the commitment of actors in the
international system to perform those tasks. Until there is adequate appreciation
at the policy level of just what vindicating a "right to democratic governance"
actually entails, exercises of this sort will run a real risk of ending in
recriminations and despair.
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